D.S. Senanayake of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)

National independence struggles in the mid-20^th century brought out some of the best leaders of those countries, whether in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Yugoslavia, Egypt, or any other country under colonial rule. They had vision, determination and a willingness to make personal sacrifices. The de-classified British cabinet papers of that past era now provide some interesting new perspectives of their relations with the Colonial Office in Whitehall that were not in the public domain earlier.

Ceylon was an exceptional non-European British colony that enjoyed partial self-government based on a legislature elected through universal adult franchise from 1931 till independence 17 years later. In 1942 Don Stephen Senanayake (popularly, and hereafter, called DS) took over the job of Vice-Chairman of the Board of Ministers and Leader of the State Council. The Board of Ministers acted like the Ceylon Cabinet in most local matters after the start of World War 2, subject to the over-riding powers of the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of British armed forces in Ceylon. With the fall of British East Asian colonies and the political opposition of the Indian Congress to the British war effort, Ceylon provided the safe haven for the British military in Asia. The selection of Peradeniya, Ceylon, for the headquarters of the Allied South East Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten seemed an obvious choice.

DS towered over his colleagues as a leader. His inter-personal skills enabled him to rise above the main competing divisive political factions in Ceylon, the Sinhala Maha Sabha, representing the Sinhala Buddhist majority who had been marginalised under hundreds of years of colonial rule and were now demanding their leading place as the majority community, and the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (representing indigenous Tamils) and the Indian Tamils (Indian labour in the plantations) linked to the Tamils in South India demanding special privileges that would effectively make them the dominant political leaders of the country. DS was not pressurised by them, opting for a middle path that would create a united Ceylonese nation[1]. His great skill in dealing with the British was his ability to align the interests of Ceylon, which wanted independence from colonialism, with those of Britain, which wanted to win the war against Japan and recover its dominant role in Asia. With his gruff personal charm, he won over the support of the Governor of Ceylon, Sir Andrew Caldecott, and later Governor Sir Henry Moore and the C-in-C of British Forces in Ceylon, Admiral Geoffrey Layton, who arrived with wide powers even over the civilian administration. On the Indian side, confrontational politics led to mass suffering in that country during the war and the eventual division of the country between Hindus and Muslims accompanied by the greatest mass migration in history and millions of deaths in brutal communal massacres.

The British government and public were in a state of emotional crisis after World War 2. The great British Empire “where the sun never sets” was over. Japanese military victories in East Asia ended the myth of the invincible military might of European nations. After the defeat of Japan, the former colonies of Britain, France and Holland were no longer prepared to accept their former colonial masters. Britain was heavily in debt to the USA, its Commonwealth members and its colonies and essential items and foodstuffs were still on ration to the public. But the British cabinet minutes of the period reveal that the government was willing to put on a bold face and rescue what it could of its past imperial glory. While the grant of self-government to British-European settler colonies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Rhodesia and South Africa was not difficult, conceding such status to Asians and Africans, “inferior races” that European imperialists claimed had to be guided by them, was not an easy decision.

Negotiations on the transfer of political power to Ceylonese were arduous. An imperial nation like Britain does not relinquish authority unless they felt that their interests would be better served under the circumstances by such a course. In 1945 Clement Atlee was Prime Minister with a Labour government and the hard-line imperialist, Winston Churchill (“I have not become His Majesty’s first minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire,”, 1940) was in the Opposition. In 1943, in response to Ceylon’s support for the British war efforts and the complementary demand for independence after the end of the war, the British Colonial Office requested the Board of Ministers to submit a proposal for constitutional reform. But when the Colonial Office afterwards also appointed the Soulbury Commission to make the reform proposals, an aggrieved Board of Ministers in Ceylon withdrew their proposals and refused to officially cooperate with the Soulbury Commission.

However, 80 witnesses representing individuals and organisations gave evidence and 12 others were heard in private by the Commissioners. The Soulbury Report recommended increased self-government but not full “Dominion Status” (which had so far been given only to the “White” settler colonies) with reserve powers for the Governor-General, mainly in defence and foreign affairs.

The British Cabinet meeting of 03 September, 1945, presided by Prime Minister Clement Atlee, devoted a lot of time to discuss the Soulbury Report and the revisions proposed by the Colonial Affairs Committee[2]. It authorised the Secretary of State for Colonies to enter into confidential discussions with D.S. Senanayake, who had come to London at the time[3], on the Soulbury Report, with the clear understanding that the British Government was not committed to the proposals in the report and that the Secretary of State for the Colonies would have to report back again to the Cabinet. It was acknowledged that without the support of DS any negotiations would fail.

The British Cabinet meeting of 11 September, 1945[4], recounts the gist of the confidential meeting of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, G.H. Hall, with DS. The statement of Rt. Hon. G.H. Hall to the cabinet on the crux of the meeting is interesting:

This course of action was approved by the Cabinet, stating “The Secretary of State for the Colonies should refrain from making any statement with regard to Dominion status for Ceylon in the course of his discussions with Mr. Senanayake.”

It was also decided to publish the Soulbury report without the issue of advance copies to the Ceylon Board of Ministers.

The report of the Lord Privy Seal, Chairman of the Colonial Affairs Committee, dated 23 October, 1945, gives details of the discussions the Colonial Secretary had with DS.

The report states that DS was very disappointed in having to leave without achieving any agreement and expresses the fear that he would now join more radical elements in Ceylon to achieve his goal, as he stated that he was now free to do so. It was feared that it would be more difficult to govern Ceylon if this happened. It recommended that the British Cabinet offer a carrot by giving a constitution broadly on the lines of the Soulbury report, which gave a broad measure of self-government with full responsibility for internal civil administrative affairs, with an undertaking to review the constitutional position in 6 years time. One of the arguments used to deny Dominion status to Ceylon was that it would be premature to do so before India and Burma came to that position.

During the Cabinet meeting of 26 October, 1945, the British Government again prevaricated and decided that while the objective of eventual grant of Dominion status should be made clear, no undertaking should be given that the constitutional situation would be reconsidered in 6 years. That state would be considered when the Ceylonese proved their ability for self-government by working within the reformed government that would be offered (based on the Soulbury report). It also recommended devising a formula for the protection of minorities as the Government in India[5] had expressed concern about minorities in Ceylon and wanted safeguards built into the proposed constitution guaranteeing voting rights and franchise for the Indian Tamils (mainly workers on the plantations imported by the British as indentured labourers), the right of re-entry to Ceylon for those labourers who had since left for India, and multi-member constituencies in selected areas to ensure their better representation in the legislature. The Colonial Affairs Committee accepted the idea of multi-member constituencies but ruled that migration, franchise and voting rights were internal matters for a Ceylon Government. The British Cabinet accepted this position.

On 29 April 1947, the Colonial Affairs Committee received a memorandum from the Secretary of State for the Colonies[6] on his meeting with Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, Financial Secretary of Ceylon, who had been sent to London by DS as his emissary. It is noteworthy that DS did not come himself but sent a subordinate who had ingratiated himself with the British with his successful handling of Ceylon’s war effort. The new argument that DS had chosen to advance his cause is interesting in the light of subsequent history:

DS was thus able to bring in the subject of India, where the attitude of the Indian National Congress with the British Government had been confrontational, while giving assurances of Ceylon’s goodwill towards Britain. The report also noted that Ceylon was willing “to negotiate agreements with His Majesty’s Government for safeguards in respect of Imperial defence and external affairs, which are at present ‘reserved subjects’”. On behalf of DS, Sir Oliver requested an immediate declaration of independence before the final meeting of the current Ceylon State Council on 13^th May, 1947, as otherwise there was the risk of some members successfully passing a resolution for full independence (outside the Commonwealth). He also noted “Mr. Senayake’s anxiety that Ceylon should be admitted to the United Nations before June, 1948.” It notes the support of the Governor of Ceylon for these proposals: “Sir Henry Moore further expresses the view that the defence interests of His Majesty’s Government might be better secured by a negotiated settlement of the nature now proposed than under the procedure laid down in the Order in Council of May, 1946, which made defence a reserved subject.”

Writing on the prospect of independence for Ceylon, the British Chiefs of Staff sent a memo to the Cabinet on 5^th May, 1947[7], wherein it stated: “Ceylon derives its importance from the commanding position it occupies in relation to our sea and air communications in the Indian Ocean. In any future war we should require to use Ceylon as a base from which to defend these communications.” The report also stated: “The immediate grant of unconditional independence is admittedly a gamble on the good faith of the leader of the Moderate Party and on his chances of being returned to power. In view of the magnitude of the issues at stake, and with the experience of the Egyptian negotiations fresh in our minds, we are convinced that from the military point of view this risk is unacceptable.” It concluded: “We conclude, therefore, that the grant of independence to Ceylon, whether now or later, must be accompanied by reservations which will ensure that our defence requirements will be adequately and permanently met.”

The memorandum by the Defence Chiefs was approved at the Cabinet meeting of 6^th May, 1947. They also decided that both Australia and New Zealand should be informed of the views of the Chiefs of Staff and other Commonwealth countries (at the time these were only the European settler nations) should be consulted without rushing into a decision. The question of safeguarding minorities in future was also made an issue.

The subject of defence and Ceylon was again highlighted in the Cabinet Paper (47) 179 of 9th June 1947. This went further than the earlier discussions and added the following: (1) The security of Ceylon against external aggression, (2) the maintenance of internal order within the country.” This would require stationing of some British troops in the island, apart from sea and air bases.

The British Cabinet meeting of 3^rd June, 1947[8], showed no inclination to advance the status of Ceylon towards independence. It stated: “it would be inadvisable to suggest that the development of events in India and Burma had been responsible for the willingness of His Majesty’s Government to consider the possibility of speedier constitutional progress in Ceylon.” It also stated: No reference should be made to the willingness of the government to lend support to an application by Ceylon for membership of the United Nations.” The Cabinet recognised that the revelation of these decisions might have an explosive effect in Ceylon and directed that the Governor of Ceylon should merely inform DS that the Secretary of State for Colonies would prepare a communication on the subject of further constitutional progress in Ceylon as directed by the Cabinet.

The preservation of Britain’s imperial status, and in fact the efforts of Western imperial nations to retain their dominance over their former colonies, was now being challenged from a new direction – the newly emerging power of the Soviet Union and its support for the communist and anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa and South America. This aspect is often forgotten by historians of the transfer of power by Europeans to their former colonies. Britain was very conscious of this threat and the Foreign Office issued a Cabinet Paper dated 4^th January, 1948, titled Future Foreign Publicity Policy[9] on countering Soviet Communist propaganda[10]. It begins with the dramatic statement: “In my paper on the first aim of British Foreign Policy (CP (48) 6) I have shown that the Russian and Communist Allies are threatening the whole fabric of Western civilization and I have drawn attention to the need to mobilise spiritual forces, a well as material and political, for its defence. It is for us, as Europeans and as a Social Democratic Government, and not for Americans, to give the lead in the spiritual, moral and political sphere to all the democratic elements in Western Europe which are anti-Communist and, at the same time, genuinely progressive and reformist, believing in freedom, planning and social justice – what one might call the “Third Force.” Equally, in the Middle East and possibly in certain Far Eastern countries such as India, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia, and Indo-China, Communism will make headway unless a strong spiritual and moral lead on the above lines is given against it, and we are in a good position to give such a lead.”

It was no longer possible for Britain to behave as an arbitrary imperial ruler around the world in the face of the growing international influence of the Soviet Union and the international communist movements it supported. In Indo-China French efforts to re-establish colonial rule were met with an armed resistance which ultimately succeeded. A similar fate awaited the Dutch in Indonesia, despite British military assistance to the Dutch. Greece was spared a communist take-over after World War 2 by a British military intervention. In Italy and France, the local communist parties were the largest parties and were threatening to take over their governments. In Ceylon in 1947, widespread trade union agitation and workers’ strikes from 1945 to 1947 led by the Marxist parties created fear among the conservative local middle-class and its leaders like DS. The British Labour Party hinted that the McCarthy witch hunts and belligerence displayed by the USA internationally may not be the viable option and instead chose to provide “moral leadership” coupled with support for moderate anti-communist leaders.

By the 18 June, 1947, Ceylon was given Dominion status as requested by DS. Between 3^rd June and 18^th June, 1947, the British cabinet had made a drastic change of policy towards Ceylon.

The August/September 1947 General Elections in Ceylon saw the triumph of the United National Party under DS with the support of some independent members, despite the Marxist parties gaining nearly a fifth of the seats. This was further strengthened when the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress joined the government and its leader, G.G. Ponnambalam, became a key cabinet minister. The British government welcomed this victory and at the British Cabinet meeting of 18 December, 1947, decided to gift to the Parliament of Ceylon the Speaker’s chair and mace, together with a new motor car for the Prime Minister, D.S. Senanayake.

The Cabinet meeting of 5 March, 1948, dwelt on the subject of British foreign policy and the need to strengthen and preserve the Commonwealth (modified from the earlier name of British Commonwealth to keep newly independent India within it). It noted: “Should India and Pakistan secede from the Commonwealth, their example might well be followed by Ceylon and, in due course, Malaya.” The meeting once again highlighted the need for anti-communist propaganda on a broad front, and also noted that Christian Churches, including the Roman Catholic Church, might be allies in this project.

The Cabinet paper of 17 March, 1948, titled the Report on Ceylon, is a very perceptive and analytical document. It begins: “Ceylon is settling down as a genuine Dominion. Present Ministers are friendly and want to maintain and deepen the British connexion. They want, for instance, to preserve English as the official language in Parliament and courts. They do not want Ceylon to be a Republic. ..”. But they noted that during the independence ceremony presided by the Duke of Gloucester, there were some public protests, minor ones that were not worrying, including protests by the Marxist parliamentarians who called it a fake independence and did not take their seats at the ceremonial opening.

Britain now showed itself amenable to the proposal by DS that the defence agreements with Britain should not be subject to a written document as it would prejudice Ceylon’s entry to the UN through opposition by communist countries. Some of the points made here were: “(a) Ceylon will insist on the formal preservation and assertion of its sovereignty and would prefer unpublished agreements and assurances to a Formal Treaty…. (c)They are not prepared to spend very much themselves on their own defence: we may need to push them on this matter. They want an independent force of their own but are thinking of a force of only 1.000 strong.” DS had made the point to the British that Ceylon’s entry to the United Nations Organisation is bound up with the Defence Agreements.

The paper also noted DS’s concern about India and his discussions with Indian Prime Minister Nehru on Tamil immigration and their citizenship demands. The Indian Tamils were already 800,000 and still growing. It noted: “Senanyake feels strongly on this matter.”

The report noted the acute problem of landlessness and Senanayake’s efforts to overcome this by new irrigation works and land settlements in jungle areas that were in ancient times cultivated regions.

A very perceptive observation in the report is this section on the social and political structures in Ceylon.

The Defence Agreement signed between DS and the Governor Sir Henry Moore on 11 November, 1947 (prior to independence), stated that the defence facilities and the sharing of costs would be undertaken “as may be mutually agreed”. This became a matter of contention after independence when Ceylon and Britain disagreed on the payment for land provided in Ceylon for the military installations, the re-location of the wireless transmission station to Trincomalee, participation of Ceylonese personnel in the control of the bases, and the volume of military aid for the Ceylon Defence Forces. Britain was in difficult financial straits, as the Cabinet Paper itself notes, and was not willing to offer Ceylon £800,000 for purchasing land from private owners for the base facilities and instead offered payment in equipment. The British Cabinet Paper of 25 July, 1952[11], describes in frustration that “Owing to the devious tactics of the Ceylon Government, no progress had been made in these negotiations.” Prime Minister Atlee’s personal letter on this subject dated 23 April, 1951, addressed to DS, remained without a reply up to the time DS died in March, 1952. Despite this, differences were papered over and the UK defence installations which had been established during World War 2 were operated in Ceylon. The absence of a formal treaty on the UK defence facilities, which Ceylon constantly declined to accept, was to prove useful later when Prime Minister S.W.R.D Bandaranaike wanted the British bases in Ceylon removed.

The First Commonwealth Ministerial Meeting on Foreign Affairs was held in Colombo during 9-14 January 1950, based on a decision at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in London in October, 1948. It was stated that international relations would be a major subject for Commonwealth countries and, as the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated, “..world problems are indivisible and that the problems of South and South- East Asia are of particular urgency. There was a remarkable unanimity of view as to the menace of Communism and as to the necessity of improving the standard of life and social welfare of the peoples of South and South-East Asia in order to combat this menace.”[12] This was the first Commonwealth ministerial meeting to be ever held in Asia and all Commonwealth countries attended. DS, as the host, proposed the following agenda items in consultation with the UK for the participating countries: (1) A general review ..; (2) Japanese Peace Treaty; (3) China; (4) South-East Asia; (5) Europe. DS was unanimously elected to preside over the meeting. The Secretary of State later reported to the British Cabinet on the arrangements in Colombo: “The arrangements by the Government of Ceylon for accommodation, welfare and entertainment of the visiting Commonwealth delegations were wholly admirable.”

The Colombo Plan for the economic development of South and South-East Asia was based on a decision taken at this meeting. The Plan was developed at a series of Consultative Committee meetings of Commonwealth countries and economic development and political stability were the objectives for the region, consisting of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak, Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Indonesia and Philippines, encompassing one-quarter of the world population. Economic assistance for the Plan was pledged by UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA and the IBRD (later popularly called the World Bank).

On 22 March, 1952, D.S. died tragically at the age of 67.He bestrode the Ceylon political scene like a colossus and his contribution to the creation of an independent Ceylon should have a paramount place in the country’s history. He was an outstanding manager and planner because of his willingness to obtain the expertise of the best brains available to him, one of whom was Sir Ivor Jennings. At one British Cabinet meeting it was noted that some British overseas representatives who were paid to look after British interests were looking after local interests. The name of Sir Ivor Jennings, Chancellor of the University of Ceylon, was mentioned as the one starting this trend[13].

With the passing of DS political dissension increased dramatically, even within his own party. And the foundations of a political system based on wealth and privilege was inevitably challenged by those who were left out of effective political and economic power.

Kenneth L. Abeywickrama

08 June, 2011

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[2] Conclusions of the British Cabinet meeting of 03 September, 1945, held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1. Cabinet Paper 27 (45).

[3] D.S. Senanayake was invited to come to London by the Soulbury Commissioners as his cooperation was essential to gain acceptance for the proposals in Ceylon.

[4] Classified as Cabinet Paper 30 (45)

[5] The Government of India had insisted that they must be consulted to ensure the rights of the minorities in Ceylon. The Soulbury report was issued accordingly simultaneously in Ceylon and India. India had insisted on a three-quarter majority in the Ceylon Council in favour of the reform proposals to protect minority rights but the British Cabinet felt that these differences could be settled between the Governments of India and Ceylon by direct negotiation.

[6] Reference Cabinet Paper (47) 144 of 2^nd May 1947.

[7] Cabinet Paper (47) 147 of 5^th May, 1947.

[8] Cabinet Meeting 51 (47) of 3rrd June, 1947.

[9] Cabinet Paper (48) 8 of 4 January, 1948, by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

[10] Cabinet Paper (48) S of 4^th January, 1948

[11] Cabinet Paper (52) 287 of 25 July, 1952.

[12] Cabinet Paper (50) 18 of 22 February, 1950.

[13] Cabinet meeting of 6 May, 1947. Remark made by Ernest Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.